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Abstract: Plant reliability and profitability are important performance indicators for oil refineries.  The 
amount of inspection and maintenance resources that is devoted to process equipment effects the 
overall plant performance.  Dedicating the same level of resources to inspecting and maintaining each 
piece of equipment is not cost effective and can lead to oversight of high risk equipment.  Although in 
an operating plant, the number of high risk items usually exists in lower percentages than low risk 
items, an oversight in the inspection and maintenance of high risk equipment may produce 
catastrophic results.  Risk based inspection (RBI) provides a methodology for prudent assignment of 
resources to assess and maintain equipment integrity based on their risk levels.  The application of 
RBI to pressure vessels and aboveground storage tanks are demonstrated through two examples 
related to a crude distillation column and a crude storage tank. 
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1 Introduction 
Inspection intervals prescribed in AS/NZS 3788:2006 Pressure equipment  In -Service Inspection [1] 
are provided to help in assuring safe operation of plant equipment during its defined run length and 
extended run length intervals.  The nominal inspection interval provides a risk level that is as low as 
reasonably acceptable based on industry experience.  Operating equipment beyond this nominal 
inspection interval (referred to as extended interval in AS/NZS 3788:2006 Table 4.1) requires: 
a. completion of at least one nominal interval, as prescribed in Table 4.1 
b. if required, completion of first yearly inspection 
c. assessment demonstrating it is safe to operate equipment with extended interval 
d. justification and documentation of change with correct operating parameters 
e. review of change proposal with a competent person 
f. formal process of notifying any process conditions change which can affect equipment integrity 
Operating equipment on an extended interval with the above requirements fulfilled provides assurance 
that the equipment can be operated safely at a risk level that is as low as reasonably practicable 
(ALARP).  Inspection practices for both nominal and extended intervals may remain at the same level 
or vary, depending on the extended interval assessment.  If the inspection practice for plant equipment 
remains the same level during its nominal and extended interval, then it can be said that the 
equipment is being inspected to a degree well above its required amount (over inspected) for a risk 
level that is ALARP during its nominal interval period.  If the inspectio n practice significantly increases 
between nominal and extended interval, then there may be an oversight of risk applicable to that 
equipment (under inspected) and the equipment may benefit from a more stringent inspection 
approach to proactively reduce this step change in risk level. 
To address this risk management gap posed by prescribed inspection intervals,  either under 
inspecting or over inspecting equipment, Risk Based Inspection (RBI) is proposed as a sound 
methodology for identifying and assessing the risks of operating plant equipment.  RBI has developed 
over the last couple of decades and it helps optimise inspection and maintenance efforts for plant 
equipment.  RBI is now widely used by many upstream and downstream oil & gas, petrochemical 
companies worldwide to various degrees, with some utilising in-house proprietary RBI software 
applications and others using commercially available RBI products.  The latest revision of AS/NZS 
3788:2006 allows the use of RBI to vary inspection intervals different to those prescribed in Table 4.1 
of the standard, refer to an extract of Table 4.1 in Figure 1.  The intent is to allow large-scale industry 
to efficiently manage plant integrity since significant resources are needed to assess risks and 
consider all relevant factors.  According to the standard, use of RBI is subject to: 
a. owner and inspection body agreement 
  
b. documentation of risk assessment and management with justifications for inspection practice 
variation 
c. multidisciplinary team approach to RBI 
d. possible fabrication and construction defects considered in terms of their effects and risks 
e. actual service conditions considered in terms of their effects and risks on the equipment design and 
material of construction 
 
Figure 1: An extract of Table 4.1 from AS/NZS 3788:2006 
2 Purpose 
Effective application of RBI relies on using a combination of relevant codes and standards, 
procedures, appropriate RBI methodology, industry knowledge, equipment familiarity and skills in 
identifying relevant damage mechanisms.  The American Petroleum Institute provides RBI guidance 
documents for the petroleum and petrochemical industries such as API RP 580 Risk-based Inspection 
[2] and API Publication 581 Risk-based Inspection Base Resource Document [3].  Appendix B of 
AS/NZS 3788:2006 provides an informative guide on risk management and it refers to AS/NZS 4360 
[4] as a generic qualitative Risk Management Standard among other references.  This paper facilitates 
sharing of knowledge on the methodology by providing two examples of RBI application to a crude 
distillation column and a crude storage tank.   
3 Overview of RBI Methodology 
RBI methodology uses equipment history and the likely consequences of equipment failure to 
determine Inspection regimes focused on actual risks, so as to prevent unsafe incidents from 
  
occurring.  The RBI method adopted by most petroleum oil refineries is based on API 581 base 
resource document which involved representatives from a number of major oil and petrochemical 
companies, and a comprehensive statistical analysis of petrochemical facilities over a number of 
years.  Due to the complexity of this RBI method, a computer-based assessment is commonly used. 
Each piece of equipment is assigned a risk ranking based on the probability  and consequence of 
failure.  Figure 2 shows a typical risk matrix. 
 
Figure 2  A typical risk matrix (Source: Capstone RBMI software).  Red boxes (no. 1 to 5) indicate high 
risk.  Pink boxes (no. 6 to 12) indicate medium-high risk.  Yellow boxes (no. 13-19) indicate medium 
risk.  Green boxes (no. 20 to 25) indicate low risk. 
Based on this risk ranking, one can decide whether to: 
· remove equipment from service and conduct inspection (if equipment is showing high risk and 
there are no suitable on-line inspection methods available that can help reduce the risk level) 
· apply appropriate on-line inspection methods for equipment to help reduce the risk level 
· add to equipment inspection scope during turnaround to aid future risk assessments 
· leave equipment on-line inspection and/or turnaround inspection scope at current level 
· reduce equipment on-line inspection and/or turnaround inspection scope from current level 
A clear understanding of expected and possible damage mechanisms for equipment is required to 
conduct the risk assessment and apply suitable inspection methods to mitigate risk posed by them.  In 
2002, a RBI industry application study by HSE in the UK [4] found that there is considerable variation 
in the selection of damage mechanism for assessment and assignment of their importance.  A 
consistent approach is required for the reporting and assessment of damage mechanism.  API RP 571 
[6] provides valuable guidance in identifying and understanding relevant damage mechanisms in 
process equipment. 
4 Application of RBI to Crude Distillation Column 
Conducting RBI on a crude distillation column requires three basic processes: 
1. Data collection and condition review 
2. Criticality assessment and stakeholders input 
3. Inspection planning and implementation 
4.1 Data Collection and Review 
The RBI process begins by collecting accurate data on the equipment with regards to its process 
conditions, operating parameters, design, construction & installation considerations, drawings, 
maintenance activities, reliability, inspection history, modifications to the equipment/process, safety 
incidents, etc.  The data collected is usually entered into a RBI software application that facilitates the 
RBI process for ease of computation, data management, inspection coordination and consistency 
between risk assessments.   
Identifying the relevant damage mechanisms and their susceptible locations are particularly important 
for managing the risk of equipment failure.  For a physically large piece of equipment such as a crude 
  
distillation column containing various process fluids, consideration is given to dividing the equipment 
into sub-components for this exercise.  The column is divided into three sections: (i) Top section - 
consisting of the top head and top section of the distillation column with light fractions; (ii) Middle 
section  representing a large portion of the distillation columns cylindrical body containing medium 
fractions; (iii) Bottom section  including the bottom head and bottom section of the distillation column 
with heavy fractions.  Refer to Table 1 for damage mechanisms identified at these three sections .  
Table 1 - Damage mechanisms in a crude distillation column, measures for their prevention/mitigation 
and inspection/monitoring.  (Compiled from damaged mechanisms covered in Ref. [6]) 
Column 
Location 
Damage 
mechanisms Prevention/Mitigation Inspection/Monitoring 
Ammonium 
Chloride 
Corrosion 
Use Ni and Ti based a lloys, but some may 
suffer pitting corrosion 
Limit chlorides in tower feed through desalting 
and/or caustic addition to desalted crude 
Flush salt deposits on overhead line with water 
wash 
Control corrosion with filming amine inhibitors 
Look for localised accumulation of ammonium 
chloride salts 
Monitor thickness loss - RT, UT 
Monitor ammonia and chlorides in feed streams 
Look for drop in thermal performance and 
pressure drop of downstream heat exchangers 
Use corrosion probes or coupons but deposits 
must be on them to work 
Top 
HCl 
Corrosion 
Reduce chloride in feed by optimising crude oil 
tank water separation & withdrawal, and crude 
desalting operation 
Upgrade carbon steel to Ni or Ti based alloys 
Water wash to quench overhead stream and 
help dilute condensing HCl concentration 
Inject caustic downstream of desalter to 
reduce amount of HCl going overhead.  Use 
proper design and operating methods to avoid 
caustic SCC and fouling in feed preheat train. 
Inject various combinations of ammonia, 
neutralising amines and filming amines in 
overhead line before water dew point. 
Monitor general thinning on carbon steel, look for 
highly localised thinning where a water phase is 
condensing 
Look for signs of serious corrosion at mix points 
where dry chloride containing streams mix with 
streams containing free water or where water 
saturated streams are cooled below the dew point 
Use UT scanning or profile RT to identify locally 
thinned areas 
Use an effective process & corrosion monitoring 
program  
Regularly check the water pH in the boot of 
overhead accumulator, also check chloride and 
iron content.  
Use strategically placed corrosion 
probes/coupons 
Sulfidation 
Upgrade to higher chromium alloy 
Use solid or clad 300 Series SS or 400 Series 
SS 
Use aluminium diffusion treatment of low alloy 
steel components 
Monitor process conditions for increasing 
temperatures and/or changing sulphur levels 
Use thermocouples and/or IR thermography to 
monitor temperature 
Check for thic kness loss with UT and RT  
Verify alloy used with PMI, prevent alloy mix-ups 
Naphthenic 
Acid 
Corrosion 
(NAC) 
Change or blend crudes, upgrade metallurgy, 
utilise chemical inhibitors. 
Use alloys with higher molybdenum content, 
317L SS 
Use high temperature NAC inhibitors  
Use RT as primary detection method for localised 
erosion, followed by UT  
Monitor Total Acid Number (TAN) and sulphur 
content of crude change and side streams 
Use corrosion probes/coupons, H2 probes 
Monitor streams for Fe and Ni content 
Erosion/ 
Erosion-
Corrosion 
(E/EC) 
Improve design on shape, geometry and 
materials selection 
Increasing substrate hardness using harder 
alloys or surface-hardening treatments 
Use corrosion-resistant alloys , alter process 
environment 
Visual inspection, UT or RT  look for 
troublesome areas and detect thickness loss 
Specialised corrosion coupons, on-line corrosion 
monitoring electrical resistance probes 
On-line IR scans 
Middle 
Chloride 
Stress 
Corrosion 
Cracking 
(Cl SCC) 
Use resistant materials, properly apply 
coatings under insulation and design out 
stagnant regions to avoid chloride 
accumulation.  High temperature stress relief 
300 Series SS after fabrication considering the 
effects of sensitisation. 
Hydrotest with low chloride content water, 
rinse & dry out thoroughly and quickly. 
Visual inspection, PT, UT, phase analysis EC 
techniques 
For PT, may need polishing or high-pressure 
water blast 
RT may not be sufficiently sensitive to detect 
cracks except in advanced stages (network of 
cracks) 
  
Column 
Location 
Damage 
mechanisms 
Prevention/Mitigation Inspection/Monitoring 
Sulfidation Refer to Sulfidation above Refer to Sulfidation above 
NAC Refer to NAC above Refer to NAC above 
E/EC Refer to E/EC above Refer to E/EC above 
Cl SCC Refer to Cl SCC above Refer to Cl SCC above 
Bottom 
885°F 
(475°C) 
embrittleme
nt 
Use low ferrite or non-ferritic alloys or avoid 
material exposure to embrittling range 
Reverse embrittlement by heat treating to 
1100°F (593°C) followed by rapid cooling(1) 
Impact or bend test sample removed from service 
Look for cracking formed during turnarounds, 
startup or shutdown when material is below 
~200°F (93°C) 
Check for increase in hardness 
Note:  (1) If the de-embrittled component is exposed to the same service conditions it will re-embrittle faster than it did initially. 
Reviewing the data collected before using them for the criticality assessment underpins an accurate 
outcome, after all, there is a saying of garbage in, garbage out.  The RBI analyst should review the 
equipment inspection history being mindful of the relevant damage mechanisms, their effects on the 
equipment and effectiveness of inspections done in the past.  Communication with stakeholders such 
as production, engineering, maintenance and inspection personnel is necessary to form a complete 
picture about the equipment and gain insight about it that is not often readily documented. 
Equipment data and information relevant to the risk assessment are entered into the RBI software 
application before criticality assessment.  A simple calculation of corrosion rates (e.g. external and 
internal) is often required and their entry into the RBI application should be accompanied by a clear 
explanation of their basis.   
4.2 Criticality Assessment and Stakeholders Input 
Criticality can be assessed for each three sections of the crude distillation column using section-
specific information to determine the consequence and probability of failure.  The consequence of 
failure usually considers flammability, toxicity and production loss, while the probability of failure 
usually considers the effects of internal & external corrosion, environmental cracking and other 
damage mechanisms.  Other considerations for consequence and probability may be included 
depending on the configuration of RBI software application and user requirements.  For the criticality 
analysis on each column section, a risk level can be evaluated for the sections current state and risk 
levels can be evaluated for the sections future states, depending on the number of equipment run 
length intervals being considered, or the level of conservatism used in the criticality analysis (e.g. 
Comparing risk using a more severe corrosion rate versus a less severe corrosion rate to reflect 
various repair or operating strategies).  Figure 3 shows a typical criticality assessment for the top head 
of a crude distillation column. 
Stakeholders input from operations, engineering, environmental, safety and maintenance departments 
may be required to accurately reflect the consequence of failure.  The RBI analyst must carefully 
interpret inspection records and seek input from experienced inspectors when addressing the 
probability of failure.  A range of personnel are involved in equipment integrity assurance and reliability 
maintenance, effective ly using the input from various stakeholders will help produce accurate criticality 
outputs for the equipments current and future states. 
 
Figure 3  A typical criticality assessment for the top head of a crude distillation column using Capstone 
RBMI, an RBI software application (© Lloyd's Register Capstone, Inc.) 
  
4.3 Inspection Planning and Implementation 
An inspection plan is developed based on the criticality evaluated in the current state and future states 
of the crude distillation column for its three sections, and the acceptable level of risk.  For example, 
following equipment turnaround with an effective inspection scope (and repairs if required), one would 
not expect the equipment to still show high criticality.  If a high criticality is evaluated for its future state 
depending on its run length, design, inspection history, relevant damage mechanisms, environment, 
operating & process conditions, and consequence parameters, then one or a combination of these 
must be addressed in order to reduce the criticality to a more acceptable level (e.g. medium or low).   
For a crude distillation column, the inspection and monitoring measures presented in Table 1 should 
be included in the inspection plan along with regular on-line visual external inspection.  The inspection 
scrutiny for each type of damage mechanism should be matched with the equipment history, as well 
as process and operating conditions. 
5 Application of RBI to Crude Storage Tank 
Application of RBI to a crude storage tank follows a similar process to the crude distillation column 
with the following exceptions. 
5.1 Data Collection and Review 
The tank is divided into three sections: (i) Bottom - consisting of the annular plates and floor island 
plates.  Sometimes, these are divided into two sub-sections for analysis.  (ii) Shell the tank shell 
strakes; (iii) Roof  the roof plates.  Relevant damage mechanisms are: 
· HCl Corrosion  related to crude heating 
· Mechanical fatigue  at shell corner joint with regular tank filling and emptying 
· Atmospheric corrosion  tank external components 
· Corrosion under insulation  for insulated crude tanks with heavy crude 
· Microbiologically induced corrosion  crude with hydrocarbon contaminants and water present 
· Soil corrosion  underside of tank bottom 
5.2 Criticality Assessment and Stakeholders Input 
Criticalities are assessed for the tank bottom, shell and roof representing the equipments current state 
and future states.   
5.3 Inspection Planning and Implementation 
An inspection plan is developed based on the criticalities evaluated in the current state and future 
states of the tank for its three sections, and the acceptable level of risk.  Implementing this plan and 
re-assessing this plan is crucial to keeping the risk ALARP. 
6 Conclusions 
With RBI, the equipment risk is managed by: 
· Understanding the failure mechanism, susceptible locations, analysing the risk of sub-
components, identify and address the highest risk, planning inspection and addressing the risk 
with stakeholders to prevent all undesired failures. 
· Monitoring process variables and reco gnising changes in the process such as upset 
conditions, change in process composition and operating limits.  A management of change 
system is required. 
· Knowing the level of inspection confidence (data representative of equipments true condition 
and location) and inspection quality.  Inspection confidence reflects how accurately inspection 
data represents the true condition of equipment, it relates to the damage type identified, 
inspection method used for its detection and location inspected.  Inspection quality reflects the 
repeatability of the inspection process in terms of equipment access, instruments, operator, 
environment and process. 
When applied and implemented properly, value is obtained from RBI by reducing equipment risk and 
cost. 
  
References 
[1]  Australian Standard, AS/NZS 3788:2006 Pressure Equipment  In-service inspection 
[2] American Petroleum Institute, API Recommended Practice 580, First edition, May 2002, Risk-based 
Inspection 
[3] American Petroleum Institute, API Publication 581, First edition, May 2000, Risk-based I nspection  Base 
Resource Document 
[4] Australian Standard, AS/NZS 4360:2004 Risk Management 
[5] Geary, W, 2002, Risk Based Inspection  A Case Study Evaluation of Onshore Process Plant, Engineering 
Control Group, Health and Safety Laboratory, Sheffield, HSE, UK.   
Website: http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/hsl_pdf/2002/hsl02-20.pdf 
[6] American Petroleum Institute, API Recommended Practice 571, First edition, December 2003, Damage 
mechanisms Affecting Fixed Equipment in the Refining Industry 
 
 
